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Abstract 
This paper develops a labour market matching model in order to address the problem of the 
persistence of the hidden sector and of its regional concentration, as in Italy and in the 
enlarged Europe. The main novel features of the model are that entrepreneurial ability affects 
job productivity, and that regular firms receive negative externalities from the hidden sector, 
which may capture the pressure typically exerted by corruption and organized crime, and 
positive externalities from the other regular firms. At least one interior equilibrium emerges, 
thus providing an explanation for the so-called “shadow puzzle”, with the possibility that 
tougher monitoring may reduce both the hidden sector and unemployment. If externalities are 
non-linear, two equilibria may emerge, thus accounting for regional dualism. The “better” 
equilibrium is in fact characterised by a smaller hidden sector, higher levels of overall 
productivity, output, entrepreneurial ability used, extra-profits, relative wages, and more 
favourable externalities. 
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1 – Introduction 
 
This paper addresses the problem of the hidden sector as a persistent and backward 
component of the economy, and as relatively concentrated in specific regions. The typical 
example is the Italian hidden sector, which consists of many small firms and productive 
activities framed in an advanced economic and institutional setting but also localised and 
linked to the specific socio-economic context of the country’s southern regions (ISTAT, 2005, 
2008; Daniele and Marani, 2008). Another example is the enlarged Europe, where the hidden 
sector is concentrated in the Eastern countries, which are also especially characterised by 
organised crime, corruption, and low law enforcement (Van Dijk, 2006; Johnson et al., 2000), 
but not necessarily by a heavy tax burden (Johnson et al., 1999). 
The paper adopts a matching model à la Pissarides (2000) extended to the hidden 
sector, to heterogeneous entrepreneurial ability, and to sectoral externalities. Although the 
extension of matching models to the hidden sector is not new in the literature (see Boeri and 
Garibaldi, 2002, 2006; Bouev, 2002, 2005; Kolm and Larsen, 2003; Fugazza and Jacques, 
2004; Albrecht et al., 2009), their additional extension to entrepreneurship is somewhat novel. 
Only Fonseca et al. (2001) and Pissarides (2002) have pursued this kind of analysis, but they 
have ignored the fact that entrepreneurship affects job productivity. If this fact is taken into 
consideration, interesting analytical consequences follow. The first is that the zero-profit 
condition, which usually applies to all firms in matching models because perfect competition 
prevails, only holds for the firm employing the minimum level of entrepreneurial ability. The 
other abler entrepreneurs earn extra-profits in posting vacancies, because entrepreneurial 
ability is a non-tradeable input for firms. The second consequence is that firms become 
heterogeneous in productivity, thus providing a new solution for the problem of finding an 
interior equilibrium, where vacant jobs are allocated to both the regular and the hidden sector. 
The extension of the model to sectoral externalities is based on the idea that 
entrepreneurial ability is embedded in a socio-economic context which may be unfavourable 
because of high transaction costs. The entry to regular production may be hindered by various 
forms of rent stemming from corruption and criminal activity, but also because market 
connections are substituted with family rent-seeking connections.
1
 By contrast, regular firms 
                                                 
1
 The southern regions of Italy constitute a typical case in which the socio-economic context of organized crime 
(Peri, 2004; Daniele and Marani, 2008), and of “amoral familism” (Banfield, 1958) has heavily burdened the 
economy. 
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may find a favourable socio-economic context when networking with the other firms is easy 
and trust prevails. 
The paper is thus able to give theoretical account for a number of facts: at the 
macroeconomic level, the persistence of a substantial proportion of the hidden sector with 
detrimental effects on overall output and productivity; at the microeconomic level, some key 
characteristics of irregular firms, such as their relatively lower entrepreneurial ability, lower 
profits and relative wages. In particular, the model is able to determine the conditions under 
which a reduction of the hidden sector increases or reduces unemployment. 
When the analysis concentrates on the role of externalities, it yields other results by 
recognising the particular non-linearity of externalities in diffusing themselves (Minniti, 
2005; Ormerod, 2005; Puga and Venables, 1996; Krugman, 1991). In this case, two 
macroeconomic equilibria may emerge within the same institutional structure and with the 
same economic potential. The “bad” equilibrium consists of a relatively large hidden sector, 
important negative externalities, and reduced positive externalities; the “good” equilibrium 
consists of a relatively small hidden sector, important positive externalities, and reduced 
negative externalities. 
This approach to the problem of the hidden economy makes it possible to extend the 
opportunity of policy actions from the fine tuning of institutional duties (Kolm and Larsen, 
2003), from larger individual benefits of participating in the regular sector (Fugazza and 
Jacques, 2004), and from labour-market liberalisation (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2002, 2006; 
Bouev, 2002, 2005), to actions intended to increase positive externalities and to reduce 
negative ones. 
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents the benchmark model; section 3 
extends the model to endogenous externalities; while section 4 concludes with some remarks 
on policy implications. The appendices set out the relevant proofs and math details. 
 
2 – The benchmark model 
 
The paper proposes a general model of equilibrium unemployment (Mortensen and 
Pissarides, 1994; Pissarides, 2000). The economic environment is characterised by a non-
competitive labour market with wage bargaining. Numerous firms competitively produce a 
homogeneous product, but adopt different institutional and technological set-ups. They may 
be registered, and therefore pay a production tax and adopt a relatively advanced technology; 
or they may not be registered, and therefore evade taxes and adopt a less efficient technology. 
 3 
Hence non-registered firms form the hidden sector of the economy, which is illegal because 
of the process employed, not because of the good being produced.
2
 
As is usual in matching-type models (Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 
2001), the meeting of vacant jobs and unemployed workers is regulated by an aggregate 
matching function ( )uvmm ii ,= , where { }sri ,∈  denotes the sector (r = regular, s = shadow), 
iv  is the number of vacancies in the sector and u  is the number of unemployed (who are the 
only job-seekers). By assumption, the matching function is non-negative, increasing, concave 
in both arguments and performs constant returns to scale, so that the job-finding rate, 
( ) ( ) ( )1 ,/, iii muuvmg θθ == , is positive, increasing and concave in the ratio of vacancies to 
unemployment, uvii /=θ . Analogously, the rate at which vacancies are filled, 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 −== iiii mvuvmf θθ ,/, , is a positive, decreasing and convex function of market 
tightness, 
iθ . Further, the Inada-type conditions hold: ( ) ( ) ∞== ∞→→ ii gf ii θθ θθ limlim 0 ; 
( ) ( ) 0limlim 0 == →∞→ ii gf ii θθ θθ , with { }sri ,∈ . 
The Bellman equations specified to find infinite horizon steady-state solutions are:
3
 
Value of … Hidden sector Official sector 
a vacancy ( ) [ ]sssss VJfcVr −⋅+−=⋅ θ  ( ) [ ]rrrrr VJfcVr −⋅+−=⋅ θ  
a filled job ( ) [ ]sssss JVwyxrJ −⋅++−= ρδ  [ ]rrrrr JVwskypxrJ −⋅+−−−+= δτ)(  
searching a job ( ) [ ]ssss UWgzUr −⋅+=⋅ θ  ( ) [ ]rrrr UWgzUr −⋅+=⋅ θ  
being employed ( ) [ ]ssss WUwWr −⋅++=⋅ ρδ  [ ]rrrr WUwWr −⋅+=⋅ δ  
 
where Vi is the value of a vacancy; Ji is the value of a filled job; Ui is the value for seeking a 
job;
4
 Wi is the value for being employed; ci is the start-up cost; z is the opportunity cost of 
employment; xi is entrepreneurial ability; y is labour productivity; 1>p  is the exogenous 
productivity premium in the regular sector; wi is the wage rate; τ is an exogenous production 
tax; ρ is the exogenous instantaneous probability of a firm being discovered (and destroyed) 
as unregistered; δ is the exogenous destruction rate. The symbols k and s denote the specific 
advantages and disadvantages for regular firms, such as the benefits of participating in a 
                                                 
2
 The general equilibrium character is particularly stressed, because the model considers two types of firms, thus 
forming two sectors, and because each firm is affected by the sectoral composition. 
3
 Time is continuous, and individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely, and discount the future at the rate r. 
4
 The unemployed cannot search for a job in both sectors at the same time (i.e. there is directed search). 
However, irrespective of the sector, if an unemployed person fails to find a job, s/he falls back into the same pool 
of unemployment. 
 4 
larger information network and of receiving specific public services, and conversely, of 
paying bureaucratic and administrative costs, including bribes and money protection if 
imposed by criminal organisations.
5
  
As usual, wages are assumed to be the outcome of a Nash bargaining problem: 
( ) ( ){ } ( )
( )
( )iiiiiiiii VJUWVJUWw −⋅−
=−⇒−⋅−= −
β
βββ
1
1maxarg  with { }sri ,∈  
where ( )1 0,∈β  is the surplus share for labour. Simple manipulations thus yield: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )rrrrrr rVskypxrUw θτβθβ −−−+⋅+⋅−= 1  
( ) ( ) ( )( )ssssss rVyxrUw θβθβ −⋅+⋅−= 1  
with ( ) 0>iiw θ'  i ∀ , since ( ) 0<iiV θ' , and ( ) 0>iiU θ'  i ∀ . 
The surplus of a job in each sector (divided between one entrepreneur and one worker 
by the wage) is defined as the sum of the worker’s and firm’s value of being on the job, net of 
the respective outside options, so that iiiii UWVJS −+−= , with { }sri ,∈ . Using the 
Bellman equations, we get: 
( ) ( ) ( )ss
ss
s
gfr
czyx
S
θβθβρδ ⋅+⋅−+++
+−⋅
=
1
; 
( ) ( ) ( )rr
rr
r
gfr
czskyxp
S
θβθβδ
τ
⋅+⋅−++
+−−−+⋅⋅
=
1
. 
Note that both the surplus and wages are heterogeneous within the two sectors, besides being 
different between them. This is because of the overall heterogeneity of entrepreneurial ability. 
Since ( ) ( ) sss SVJ ⋅−=− β1  and ( ) ( ) rrr SVJ ⋅−=− β1 , it is straightforward to get: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )ss
ssss
s
gfr
grczyxf
xrV
θβθβρδ
θβρδβθ
⋅+⋅−+++
⋅+++⋅−−⋅⋅−⋅
=
1
1
                    [1] 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )rr
rrrr
r
gfr
grczskyxpf
xrV
θβθβδ
θβδτβθ
⋅+⋅−++
⋅++⋅−−−−+⋅⋅⋅−⋅
=
1
1
                    [2] 
As in Fonseca et al. (2001), we ignore the range beyond which iθ  is large enough to 
turn irV  negative. Hence, it must be that ∈iθ [0, iθ
~
) i ∀ , where ∞<iθ
~
 is the value such that 
( ) 0=iiV θ~ . Furthermore, since for 0=iθ  the vacancy would be always filled, the relevant 
interval for iθ  becomes ∈iθ (0, iθ
~
) i ∀ , which implies 0≠u , 0≠iv  i ∀ . 
 
2.1 Entrepreneurial ability and the career choice 
A key feature of the model is that the comparison between the expected profitability of 
posting vacancies in the two sectors depends on the entrepreneurial ability of individuals ( x ). 
                                                 
5
 Both s and k are assumed as parameters in this section, but they will be treated as variables in section 3. 
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In this model, indeed, job productivity depends on both entrepreneurial ability and labour 
productivity, whereas in Fonseca et al. (2001) and Pissarides (2002) entrepreneurial ability 
does not affect job productivity, and in Albrecht et al. (2009) and Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) 
job productivity only depends on labour productivity. Each individual is assumed to be 
endowed with a specific entrepreneurial ability, and all individuals are heterogeneous with 
respect to this ability. Formally, entrepreneurial ability x  is distributed over a continuum of 
infinitely-living individuals who expect to enter the labour market, and it can be measured in 
continuous manner, ∈  x ] 0[ maxx, , following the known c.d.f. F :[ maxx ,0 ] [ ]1 0,→ . 
The minimum ability required to open a vacancy in the hidden sector can be obtained 
very simply from the zero-profit condition, i.e. from 0=sV  in equation [1]: 
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
0
1
lim 0 >=⇒





⋅+++
−⋅⋅−
=→
y
z
x
gr
zyx
f
c
min
ss
s
s
s
sv θβρδ
β
θ
 
Therefore, the zero-profit condition can be used to distinguish entrepreneurs from workers.
6
 
The minimum level of ability 
minx  is not only the threshold for individuals to become 
entrepreneurs in the hidden sector, it is also the threshold to become an entrepreneur 
generally, because the level of ability required to enter the regular sector is even higher, as 
will shortly be made clear. Since ability is not tradeable, all the individuals endowed with 
minxx >  will earn extra-profit as a rent in posting vacancies. Accordingly, for an equal or 
lower level of ability, individuals become workers and then do not post any vacancy. 
Let us now define a threshold level of entrepreneurial ability ∈  T ],] maxmin xx  such that 
two entrepreneurs drawn from the two sectors yield equal expected profitability, i.e.: 
( ) ( )TxVTxV sr ===                                                [3] 
T  can therefore be derived in a straightforward way from equations [1], [2], and [3]: 
( )
11
11
+
−
+
+
⋅+
−
+
⋅+−++
=
B
y
A
py
B
Bcz
A
Acksz
T
srτ
                                                                                   [4] 
with ( )
( ) ( )r
r
f
gr
A
θβ
θβδ
⋅−
⋅++
≡
1
 and ( )
( ) ( )s
s
f
gr
B
θβ
θβρδ
⋅−
⋅+++
≡
1
. 
In order to have a positive expression on the r.h.s of [4], the following restrictions are 
sufficient: ( ) 0>−+ ksτ , ( ) scksz >−++τ , zcr > , and p must be sufficiently great (see 
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 In a framework in which the number of firms is fixed, the zero-profit condition is no longer used to determine 
the labour market tightness (see Fonseca et al., 2001, and Pissarides, 2002). 
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Appendix A for the details). The first three restrictions are realistic,
7
 the fourth restriction is 
necessary for the regular sector to be able to survive. An interesting result can be obtained 
from these restrictions, given that it has been observed that the intercept of ( )xVr  is more 
negative than the intercept of ( )xVs , and that the slope of ( )xVr  is steeper than the slope of 
( )xVs . 
========== Figure 1 about here (now at the end) ========== 
Remark 1. Official jobs are manage by the relatively more able entrepreneurs. 
This is one of the key results of the benchmark model, and it runs counter to the argument that 
the hidden sector is an incubator of infant industries: in fact, regular firms are more 
productive because they are run by more able entrepreneurs (see also Pugno, 2000a; Carillo 
and Pugno, 2004; Rauch, 1991, Levenson and Maloney, 1998). 
From the macroeconomic point of view, the entrepreneurs’ indifference condition [3] 
implies that the share of entrepreneurs who open a vacancy in the hidden sector is 
( ) svlTF =− , while the share ( ) rvTF =−1  opens a vacancy in the official sector. 
Entrepreneurs may thus post a vacancy and then fill the job, or fail to fill it, in one of the two 
sectors, so that it can be simply stated that ( )lvv sr +−= 1 .8 Hence, equation [4] can be re-
written in a more general form as follows: 
( )svTT =                  [4’] 
since u is given to the entrepreneurs. The property that 0<∂∂ svT /  follows from the 
restrictions ( ) sr ckszc >−++> τ , which include the previous ones (see again Appendix A). 
Equations ( )svTT =  can be coupled with the equation ( )Tvv ss = , which depends on 
the distribution of ability across entrepreneurs and is monotonically rising in T from minx  up 
to maxx . Both equations can be represented in the diagram with axes [ sv ,T ], as in fig. 2. 
Equation [4’] has been built for T∈] minx , maxx ], so that its vertical start-point is higher than the 
intercept of ( )Tvv ss = . 
========== Figure 2 about here (now at the end) ========== 
Remark 2. A unique couple of ( vs , T ) exists in the model. 
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 The value of the start-up cost in the hidden sector cs should be very low, since ease of entry is often one of the 
criteria used to define the informal sector (Gërxhani, 2004). By contrast, the start-up cost cr is often very heavy 
because of excessive regulations, administrative burdens, licence fees, bribery (Bouev, 2005). 
8
 In this model the number of incumbent entrepreneurs is exogenous and outside the population, i.e. vr + vs + u + 
2(nr + ns) = 1 + nr + ns. Matters thus become simpler without loss of generality. 
 7 
This second key result rules out the possibility of a perverse equilibrium whereby the more 
able entrepreneurs enter the hidden sector. 
 
2.2 The unemployment equation 
Although the economy has two sectors, empirically we observe a unique rate of 
unemployment. Since the total share of workers in the population is l, the unemployment 
identity requires: 
srsr nnluuu −−=≡+                                                                                                              [5] 
where 
rn  and sn  represent steady-state employment in the official and hidden sectors, 
respectively. Since jobs arrive to unemployed workers at the rate ( )ig θ , with { }sri ,∈ , and 
regular and irregular filled jobs are destroyed at the rate δ  and ( )ρδ + , respectively, then in 
the steady state equilibrium it must be that: 
( )rr gun θδ ⋅=⋅                                     [6]    
( ) ( )ss gun θρδ ⋅=⋅+                         [7]  
Steady-state unemployment is thus given by [5], [6] and [7]: 
( ) ( )
1+
+
+
=
ρδ
θ
δ
θ sr gg
l
u                                                           
                                            
[8] 
Equation [8] closes the model, since u, which has been previously given to the 
entrepreneurs, can now be determined, and the following result can be drawn: 
Proposition. An aggregate equilibrium with positive u exists and is unique. The 
qualitative results obtained in partial equilibrium, where u is given, also hold in general 
equilibrium, where u is endogenous (see Appendix B for proofs). 
Hence, the equilibrium of the model can be defined thus: 
Definition. The solutions for the four key variables sv , rv , T  and u  are obtained by 
considering: 1) the Bellman equations; 2) the entrepreneur’s indifference condition between 
running firms in the two sectors, given their entrepreneurial ability distribution; 3) the 
unemployment identity and the equilibrium condition of the transition flows on the supply side 
of the labour market. 
 
2.3 Discussion 
The main result is that an interior solution exists whereby both the hidden sector and 
the regular sector survive in equilibrium (see also Pugno, 2000a, and Carillo and Pugno, 
 8 
2004). This may explain the so-called “shadow puzzle”, i.e. the persistence of the hidden 
sector despite advances in detection technologies and in organisation by public authorities to 
reduce irregularities (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006). 
A number of other important results can be drawn from comparative statics exercises. 
A general exercise concerns the effects of the shift of the T-curve [4] due to changes in some 
parameters. Its downward shift decreases both the (partial) equilibrium of sv  in fig. 2, and the 
model’s (general) equilibrium of sv . Therefore, the downward shift of the T-curve [4] 
squeezes the proportion of the hidden sector and expands the proportion of the regular sector, 
as clearly emerges from the definitions of sv  and rv , and as can be easily derived from 
equations [5], [6] and [7] jointly. 
The downward shift of the T-curve [4] can thus increase overall output, because it 
increases the proportion of the most productive sector. The regular sector is in fact more 
productive than the hidden sector for two reasons: the regular sector exhibits the premium p, 
which captures its higher technological level, and the most able entrepreneurs prefer this 
sector. 
The downward shift of the T-curve [4] also increases the shadow wage gap, i.e. the 
wage differentials between the two sectors. This effect is due to the rise of the equilibrium 
level of rv , since the wages are increasing functions with respect to the vacancies level. 
The main policy implications of the benchmark model can be drawn from the effects 
of the changes in the policy parameters on T, and hence on the proportion of the hidden 
sector, i.e.: 
0<
∂
∂
ρ
T
, since 0>
∂
∂
ρ
B
; 0>
∂
∂
τ
T
; 0>
∂
∂
rc
T
. 
In words, closer monitoring, lower taxation and lower start-up costs reduce the hidden sector. 
This is in line with the conclusions of other models (see e.g. Friedman et al., 2000; Johnson et 
al., 2000; Sarte, 2000; Bouev, 2005). 
A new important contribution of the benchmark model regards a much more 
controversial question, i.e. the intricate relationship between unemployment and hidden 
economy. Indeed, according to the matching model of Bouev’s (2002, 2005) scaling down the 
unofficial sector can lead to a decrease in the level of unemployment; whereas according to 
the matching model of Boeri and Garibaldi (2002, 2006) attempts to reduce, in the first place, 
shadow employment will result in higher open unemployment. This model says that if vs > vr 
a reduction of the hidden sector decreases unemployment, whereas with vr > vs a reduction of 
 9 
the hidden sector increases unemployment if the monitoring parameter ρ is sufficiently low or 
even zero, and it decrease unemployment if ρ is sufficiently great (see the Appendix C). This 
is an interesting result from the policy implications point of view. In fact, in the more usual 
case where vr > vs, the role of the monitoring parameter is strengthened: in fact, if ρ is 
sufficiently great, any policy directed to reduce the irregular sector may also reduces the 
unemployment rate.
9
 
 
 3 – The model with endogenous externalities 
 
The performances of regular and irregular firms differ not only because of their 
technological level and other specific economic features but also because of the socio-
economic contexts in which they operate. Indeed, if regular firms are diffused and pervasive 
in the economy with respect to irregular firms, information flows more easily, trust is more 
widespread, networking is more frequent, and a more efficient use of public services, 
including information and assistance from the public authorities and agencies, becomes 
possible.
10
 By contrast, if the hidden sector is widespread, large negative externalities on the 
regular firms may be at work. The unfortunate cases of the southern Italian regions and the 
eastern European countries provide the clearest example of these externalities, because in 
those regions the hidden sector is likely linked to the illegal sector and to criminal 
organisations. Transaction costs become greater in this case, market networking becomes 
distorted, and tax morality worsens.
11
 
Both positive and negative externalities can be characterised by a non-linearity which 
is typical of contagion-type diffusion. In the case of positive externalities, the diffusion of 
information and trustful entrepreneurial behaviour typically exhibits the bandwagon effect, 
                                                 
9
 Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2009) focus on the role of job destruction rate. According to their matching model, 
policies that reduce the cost of formality (or those that increase the cost of informality) produce an increase in 
the share of formal employment while also reducing unemployment because the reallocation between formal and 
informal jobs has non-neutral effects on the unemployment rate, since informal jobs report much higher 
separation rates. 
10
 There is a large body of evidence for the spillover effects on productivity. See Cooper and Haltiwanger (1996) 
for a survey on this literature. For the importance of social networks for entrepreneurship see Aldrich and 
Zimmer (1986), and Granovetter (1985). 
11
 Cross-section analysis of developed and developing countries shows that the size of the hidden sector is 
significantly negatively correlated with generalised trust (D’Hernoncourt and Méon, 2008), and that generalised 
trust is negatively correlated with corruption. Although the connection between trust and corruption is reciprocal, 
the effect of trust on corruption seems greater than the reverse (Uslaner, 2002). Further, hidden activity is larger 
in countries where managers are more likely to pay bribes, where managers pay for mafia-type protection, where 
managers have less faith in the legal system (Johnson et al., 2000), and where corruption is generally more 
widespread (Buehn and Schneider, 2009). 
 10 
which characterises the acceleration of the central phase of the diffusion process (Minniti, 
2005). A similar pattern seems to be exhibited by criminal behaviour (Glaeser et al., 1996) 
and criminal enterprises (Pugno, 2000b), which exert negative externalities on regular firms. 
The S-shaped pattern of diffusion is based on Schelling’s argument (1978: ch.3) of critical 
mass in imitative behaviour on the spatial dimension (see also Granovetter 1978). The non-
linear diffusion also emerges if imitation simply follows costs reduction because of strategic 
complementarities on the spatial dimension, thus explaining geographical concentration 
(Krugman, 1991; Puga and Venables, 1996). 
Our model is able to capture these phenomena with interesting results. Let us cease 
considering s and k as fixed parameters and treat them as logistic functions of rv  and sv : 
( )svss =                                                                                                                                     [9] 
( )rvkk =                                                                                                                                  [10] 
The key property of [9], which is monotonically increasing with respect to sv , is convexity in 
the first phase and then concavity. Function [10] has the same properties with respect to rv , 
but opposite properties with respect to sv , so that their algebraic sum reinforces the non-linear 
effect in the same direction. Both functions are bounded. 
If the functions ( )svs  and ( )svlk −−1  as in [9] and [10] are plugged into [4], then the 
relationship between T and sv  can change significantly because a “hump” can arise in the 
representation on the ( )Tvs  , –axes. The threshold value of entrepreneurial ability T is in fact 
declining when sv  remains low, but it can rise when the density of the irregular firms 
accelerates the negative externalities and decelerates the positive externalities, since greater 
entrepreneurial ability is required (after these effects of the externalities, the usual forces that 
reduce T once again prevail). This captures two distinct facts: that a widespread hidden sector 
discourages the establishment of regular firms, thus reducing the proportion of the regular 
sector; and that efficient networking requires numerous regular partner firms. 
If accelerations and decelerations are significant and externalities diffuse themselves 
roughly, then three intersections become possible, as depicted in fig. 2 (dotted line), and as it 
can be checked by simulations with parameter values drawn from the literature (see Appendix 
D).
12
 The two extreme equilibria, which are the relevant ones, may be labelled as “good” and 
“bad” because they define two different conditions where the proportion of the hidden sector 
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 Also Minniti’s (2005) model of entrepreneurship and non-linear externalities, but without the hidden sector, 
exhibits multiple equilibria. 
 11 
is small and, respectively, large; production is high and, respectively, low; the entrepreneurial 
ability is used efficiently and, respectively, inefficiently; shadow wage gap is high, and, 
respectively, low; negative externalities are limited, and, respectively, widespread; positive 
externalities are exploited, and, respectively, scarce. 
This result is interesting because it can represent an economy characterised by a 
uniform structure, including the institutional structure, as captured by the same parameters of 
the model, but with two regional economies that differ in their histories alone. The region 
starting with a greater proportion of the hidden sector may converge towards the “bad” 
equilibrium, while the region starting with a smaller proportion of the hidden sector may 
converge towards the “good” equilibrium. Distortions, both costly and beneficial, develop 
differently, and eventually establish a dualism in both economic and social aspects. The 
Italian North-South divide, which is special but not unique in the world, can thus find an 
explanation. 
  
 4 – Final remarks 
 
This paper has proposed a model able to account for the persistence and the 
localisation of the hidden sector. The persistence is captured by the interior equilibrium, 
where the hidden sector coexists with the regular sector. The key assumption yielding this 
result is a new and also natural one, i.e. the heterogeneous ability of entrepreneurs that affects 
job productivity. The localisation of the hidden sector due to the socio-economic context is 
captured by the possibility of two equilibria, given the same structure of parameters, where 
the hidden sector may be substantial and negligible respectively, depending on the starting 
conditions, i.e. on history. The key assumption yielding this result is again a new one, i.e. 
sufficient negative externalities from the hidden sector, and positive externalities from the 
regular sector, on regular firms. 
The model also suggests some policy measures besides the more usual ones, although 
it is not designed to determine the optimal policy. Any policy action that discourages the 
profitability of irregular firms will improve the overall production level and productivity 
through the composition effect. Entrepreneurs take advantage of their abilities to “go over-
ground”, while tax morality is strengthened. 
The extended model yields a further result, since it suggests policy actions from the 
sectoral perspective, rather than from the firm perspective alone, with possible powerful 
effects. Policy measures may be directed at changing the externalities. In the case of negative 
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externalities, the contagion effect should be combatted, for example, by supporting those 
firms which pledge not to pay bribes and protection money, and by building a virtuous 
network of customer, creditors, etc. for them. In the case of positive externalities, 
infrastructure, network facilities and specific public services for regular firms should be 
provided. These policy measures may be especially effective in that they can trigger an 
endogenous change from the equilibrium where the hidden sector is substantial to the 
equilibrium where the hidden sector is negligible. 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Properties of equation [4] 
The threshold T is a special x, so that it must be positive since 0≥> minxx . Hence, also 
the r.h.s of [4] must be positive. Sufficient conditions for the positivity of the r.h.s of [4] are: 
1
1
1 +
>
+ BA
p
            [A.1] 
( )
11 +
⋅+
>
+
⋅+−++
B
Bcz
A
Acksz srτ          [A.2] 
Let us examine the limit of these conditions for 
rv  (and sv ) which goes to zero. 
• If 0→rv , then 0→A  and { }∞<<→ BB 0 , so that: 
1
1
+
>
B
p , which is always true since 1>p , and 
( ) ( )
( ) sr
s
cksz
kszz
B
B
Bcz
ksz
−−++
−++−
>⇒
+
⋅+
>−++
τ
τ
τ
1
, which requires as sufficient conditions 
that: ( ) 0>−+ ksτ , and ( ) scksz >−++τ . 
• If 0→sv , then 0→B  and { }∞<<→ AA 0 , so that: 
( )11
1
+>⇒>
+
Ap
A
p
 which requires that p is sufficiently greater than 1, 
( ) ( )
zc
kszz
Az
A
Acksz
r
r
−
−++−
>⇒>
+
⋅+−++ ττ
1
, with requires zcr >  as a sufficient 
condition to hold. 
The proof that 0<∂∂ svT  in [4] thus becomes straightforward, having recalled that 
rs vvl +=−1 , and that uvii /=θ . Since 0<
∂
∂
sv
A
 and 0>
∂
∂
sv
B
, the main denominator of [4] is 
rising in 
sv , i.e. 0
1
1
1
>





+
−
+∂
∂
BA
p
vs
, while, the main numerator of [4] is decreasing in 
sv : 
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( )
0
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+
−
=





+
⋅+
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B
zc
B
Bcz
B
ss      if zcs > . 
The complete restriction set of the parameters can thus be reduced: ( ) sr ckszc >−++> τ . 
Note that these are sufficient but not necessary conditions to obtain 0<∂∂ svT . 
 
Appendix B: Proof of the proposition in section 2.2 
In order to prove the existence and uniqueness of the solution for u, let us rewrite 
equation [8] as follows: 
( ) ( )
1
//
+
+
+
=
ρδδ
uvguvg
l
u
sr
 = Γ(u)                                                                                         [8’] 
It can be observed that u ranges between 0 and l (where l < 1), and that the r.h.s. of [8’] is a 
rising and concave function in u for given vr and vs, because ( ) 0/ <∂∂ ug iθ  and 
( ) 0/ 22 >∂∂ ug iθ . Since ( ) 0lim 0 =Γ→ uu  and ( ) lulu <Γ→lim , because of the Inada conditions, 
a unique intersection exists between the l.h.s. and the r.h.s. of [8’]. 
Since vr and vs vary with u, equation [8’] can be rewritten as follows: 
( ) ( )
1
/)(/)(
+
+
+
=
ρδδ
uuvguuvg
l
u
sr
           
                                                                                [8”] 
Note that induced changes of vr(u) and vs(u), through changes in T, cannot cumulate because 
vr and vs are complementary, being sr vvl +=−1 . Further, since the properties of ( )uΓ  hold 
even if either vr or vs goes to zero, a unique intersection also exists between the l.h.s. and the 
r.h.s. of [8”]. 
In order to prove that the qualitative results which are obtained in partial equilibrium 
also hold in general equilibrium, it is sufficient to prove that: 
sign
( )






∂
∂
s
s
v
vT
=sign
( )






∂
∂
s
ss
v
vuvT )(,
<0, where u is fixed in the first term, while in the second 
term u=u(vs) is the explicit general form of [8’].  
This inequality follows from the conditions: 
• 
( )






∂
∂
s
s
v
vT
<0, as obtained in the Appendix A; 
• 





∂
∂
u
A
<0, 





∂
∂
u
B
<0, and to 





∂
∂
A
T
>0, 





∂
∂
B
T
<0, as obtained in the Appendix A under the 
stated restrictions on the parameters. 
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Finally, when 
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takes place when vr > vs, while the latter case takes place when vs > vr. If ρ is sufficiently high, 
then 



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∂
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<0. 
 
Appendix C: Beveridge Curves analysis 
From equation [8], it is straightforward to get the Beveridge Curve of both sectors:
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Assuming as in Boeri and Garibaldi’s (2006) calibrations that sr θθ > , i.e. sr vv >  
(which is a realistic situation also in the developing and transition countries), and knowing 
that ( ) 0' >ig θ , ( ) 0'' <ig θ , we obtain ( ) ( )rs gg θθ '' > . Hence, if there is no monitoring 
( 0=ρ ), the unemployment rate increases when the irregular vacancies decreases, because the 
Beveridge Curve of the hidden sector is steeper than the Beveridge Curve of the official 
sector, i.e. rs vuvu ∂∂>∂∂ // . 
However, a positive level of monitoring is a necessary condition to preserve legal jobs. 
Indeed, there is an efficient level of monitoring which reverses the previous result: 
( ) ( )[ ]{ } σθθδρ ≡−⋅> 1rs gg '/'          [C.1] 
which is a positive value since ( ) ( )[ ] 1>rs gg θθ '/' . If σρ > , then the unemployment rate 
increases when the irregular vacancies increases, because now it is the Beveridge Curve of the 
official sector that is steeper. 
Note that in the inverse case ( σρ < ) we cannot ensure that the monitoring rate is 
positive, since σ may be a very small value. 
                                                 
13
 Indeed, equation [8], like the standard Beveridge Curve, is a decreasing and convex function with respect to 
both vr and vs: 
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where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ρδδθδθρδ +⋅+⋅+⋅+≡ sr ggH . 
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Appendix D: Multiple equilibria 
The baseline specification of the model’s parameters has been drawn from Boeri and 
Garibaldi (2006), and it is the following:
14
 
parameter notation regular sector hidden sector 
workers’ surplus share β 0.50 
discount rate r 0.03 0.03 
monitoring rate ρ – 0.06 
destruction rate δ 0.15 0.15 
unemployed income z 0.10 0.00 
production tax τ 0.20 – 
unemployment rate (unweighted sectors average) u 0.0981 
search cost c 0.40 0.40 
matching elasticity a 0.50 0.50 
matching function constant A 0.50 0.50 
 
We follow the bulk of the existing literature by assuming a Cobb-Douglas matching 
function (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001; Stevens, 2007): aa
ii uvAm ⋅⋅=
−1 , with { }sri ,∈ . 
Regarding function ( )Tvs , we use a distribution for the entrepreneurial ability x that is 
negative exponential.
15
 The simulation considers logistic functions, i.e.: 
s = 
sve 321
1
Φ−Φ+
Φ
                                                                                                                     [D.1]
 
k = 
rve 321
1
Ω−Ω+
Ω
                                                                                                                     [D.2] 
the parameter values in equations [D.1] and [D.2] are calibrated so as to ensure that 0>T .16 
The simulation’s result is depicted in fig. 3. 
 ========== Figure 3 about here (now at the end) ========== 
In short, the simulation shows the special role played by the parameters which regulate 
the acceleration/deceleration of the externalities: in fact, the greater is 3Φ  and the lower is 
3Ω , the higher is the “hump” of the extended function [4], because the negative externalities 
rise faster and the positive ones end up quicker. 
                                                 
14
 The productivity premium is calibrated so as to ensure T > 0 (see Appendix A). 
15
 A negative exponential distribution is used by Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) for the distribution of productivity. 
16
 Greek capital letters denote the horizontal position of the inflection point, if numbered with 2, and the slope of 
the function, if numbered with 3. The parameter Φ1 captures the administrative and bureaucratic burdens and the 
maximum burden imposed by the criminal context, while Φ3 denotes the acceleration effect when the critical 
density of the criminal activity has been approached. Similarly, Ω1 captures the maximum possible effect of the 
positive externalities arising from the diffusion of regular firms, while Ω3 denotes the acceleration effect of these 
externalities. 
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Figure 2. Interior equilibrium and multiple equilibria 
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